In Brown v.
Finally, Bolling is an important example of the distorting effect of Lochnerphobia on Supreme Court jurisprudence. Bolling would have been a much stronger opinion had it been willing to explicitly rely on Lochner era precedents such as Meyer, and to employ a more explicitly Lochnerian view of the Due Process Clause.
governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause. 7 Thus, the opinion made the following points: first, that although the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause, the concepts of equal protection and due process both arise from the American ideal of fairness. 8 While not interchangeable, the phrases are not mutually exclusive, and the Court has previously recognized that unjustified discrimination may violate due process. 9 Second, classifications based on race "must be scrutinized with particular care" because they run contrary to American tradition. 10 And, third, forcing Blacks to attend segregated schools arbitrarily deprives them of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.
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In subsequent opinions, the Supreme Court interpreted Bolling as an equal protection case, 12 and it eventually held that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause contains an equal protection guarantee precisely equivalent to that of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 13 However, as Larry Lessig has noted, a close reading of Bolling reveals that " [w] hat is significant about the actual opinion . . . is not that the Court found an 'equal protection component' to the Due Process Clause. No such 'component' was ever 'found. '" 14 While dicta in Bolling state that the concept of due process overlaps to some extent with the concept of equal protection, the ultimate holding of the Court is based on the traditional due process concern that the government not engage in arbitrary deprivations of liberty. 15 As Justice
David Souter has explained, Bolling concluded that the federal government had no legitimate 7 Bolling, 347 U.S. at 498-500 (citations omitted). 8 See id. at 499. 9 See id. at 499 n.2. 10 See id. at 499. 11 See id. at 500. 12 See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1964) (citing Bolling for the proposition that "while the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process."). 13 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) ("This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment."). As we shall see, the statement in this parenthetical is incorrect, but it does reflect the state of the law from 1975 until today. 14 Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 409 (1995) . 15 See Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.
government interest in requiring segregated schools that could overcome Blacks' contrary liberty interest not to be relegated to Jim Crow schools. 16 The only novelty in Bolling is the idea that forcing Blacks to attend segregated schools infringed on a liberty right protected by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Once the Court identified this liberty right, the only remaining question was whether the federal government could justify school segregation as a valid exercise of the federal government's exercise of sovereign authority in the District of Columbia. Given that Brown failed to accord any weight to (or even mention) the defendants' state police power arguments in favor of segregation, 17 the answer was obviously "no."
Part I of this Essay reviews scholarly criticism of Bolling. With the exception of Lessig, 18 legal scholars have not seriously addressed Bolling's stated "substantive due process" 19 rationale. Rather, scholars criticize Bolling for purportedly holding that the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause provides an equal protection guarantee equivalent to that of the Equal Protection Clause. To critics of the Warren Court, Bolling is an example of judicial activism run amok, with the Warren Court using the Due Process Clause to avoid reaching a constitutionally mandated result that considered "unthinkable" for extra-legal reasons. By contrast, scholars more sympathetic to Warren Court jurisprudence embrace the result in Bolling, but reject, or at least refuse to endorse, its reliance on the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
As we shall see in Part II, there was in fact precedent far stronger than the rather lame precedents cited by the Court 20 supporting Bolling's dicta that due process and equal protection 16 (1954) . 18 See Lessig, supra note 14. 19 I dislike the term "substantive due process," but will use it in this Article because of its widespread use to describe jurisprudence protecting liberty rights via the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. As applied to Lochner-era jurisprudence, and perhaps even to Bolling, the phrase "substantive due process" is anachronistic. See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 245 (2000) (explaining that it was not until the 1950s that jurisprudence under the Due Process Clause was firmly separated by courts and legal scholars into "substantive" and "procedural" categories). 20 The Court cited three Fifth Amendment cases in support of its statement that "as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process": Currin is of no help to the Court, as it simply states that although the exercise of the commerce power is subject to the Fifth Amendment, "that Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, has no equal protection clause." 306 U.S. at 14. Davis repeats the same point, though it adds that the Court assumes that discrimination in taxation, "if gross enough, is equivalent to confiscation and subject under the Fifth Amendment to challenge and annulment." 301 U.S. at 585. Detroit Bank, meanwhile, states on the one hand that the Fifth Amendment "contains no equal protection limits on government's power to discriminate overlap to some extent. The historical relationship between due process and equal protection is discussed in Part II.
More important, critics fail to grapple with Bolling's holding that public school segregation was an arbitrary violation of Black students' due process liberty interest in pursuing their education. Strong precedents from the 1910s and 1920s supported Bolling's conclusion that due process of law prohibited the government from classifying based on race or sex when doing so resulted in a violation of liberty or property rights, and the classification in question was not based on any inherent differences between the groups classified.
Bolling, in fact, referenced a 1917 precedent directly on point-Buchanan v. Warley.
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Buchanan invalidated a residential segregation ordinance under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as a deprivation of liberty and property not justified by the state's claimed police power interests in keeping the races separate. 22 Lochner era precedent also supported
Bolling's implicit conclusion that violation of liberty rights protected by the Due Process Clause could not be justified by appeals to prejudice against, or fear of, minority groups. 23 Once the Court identified a property or liberty interest protected by the Constitution's guarantee of due process of law, a deprivation of this liberty could not be justified by mere racism, sexism, or hostility toward minorities. 24 However, as I will show in Part III, the Court failed to cite these precedents because of Lochnerphobia-the Court, responding in particular to objections from Justice Black, did not want to seen as endorsing or reviving the substantive due process jurisprudence of the Lochner era.
I. SCHOLARLY CRITICISM OF BOLLING
clause and it provides no guaranty against discriminatory legislation by Congress." 317 U.S. at 337. On the other hand, the Court acknowledges that discriminatory legislation "may be so arbitrary and injurious in character as to violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 338. Each of the latter two cases could be interpreted not as stating that the Due Process Clause contains an equal protection component, but as stating that taxation is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause when it amounts to arbitrary confiscation. Concern with arbitrary confiscation is not quite the same as the traditional equal protection concern with arbitrary classification. Moreover, in each of these cases the Court ruled against the plaintiff, leaving any Fifth Amendment basis for invalidating discriminatory legislation vague and unclear, at least based on these precedents. 21 
II. DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
The idea that due process considerations limited government's power to discriminate stretches back to the early years of the American republic. 58 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to the extent it was thought to have "substance" at all, was initially thought to include-and perhaps even be limited to-a prohibition on discriminatory "class" legislation. 59 In the early twentieth century, several state courts explicitly invalidated discriminatory legislation based solely on due process considerations. 64 Raoul Berger claims that the idea that the due process includes an equal protection component was "born" in Bolling. 65 Robert Bork argues that the Court's assertions "rested on no precedent or history." 66 Lucas Powe asserts that the Supreme Court had never before found that the due process and equal protection clauses banned similar actions.
67
Lawrence Sager finds Bolling's antidiscrimination doctrine "baldly prochronistic." 68 
Akhil
Amar insists that the meanings of due process and equal protection do not overlap. 69 In fact, however, a long tradition in American thought held that for legislation to be considered "the law of the land," and thus consistent with due process, it must be a "general and public law, equally binding upon every member of the community." 70 Meanwhile, "every partial or private law . . . is unconstitutional and void." 71 By the postbellum period, "partial" or "unequal" legislation was usually referred to as "class legislation." 72 While some authors have closely associated the concept of class legislation with the modern concept of special interest legislation, 73 in practice, by the late nineteenth century, class legislation was primarily legislation that contained arbitrary classifications.
74
In the period just before the Court adopted the liberty of contract doctrine, Supreme Court precedent suggested that when states asserted they were acting within their police power, due process protection included, or perhaps was even limited to, a ban on class legislation. The
Equal Protection Clause, of course, also prohibited unequal legislation, and did so more ) ("The test of uniform operation, and with respect to the required conformity to the 'law of the land' and to the requirement of 'due process of law,' seems to be that if the law under consideration operates equally upon all who come within the class to be affected, embracing all persons who are or may be in like situation and circumstances, and the designation of the class is reasonable, not unjust nor capricious or arbitrary, but based upon a real distinction, the law does operate uniformly, and if, added to this, the law is enforced by usual and appropriate methods, the requirement as to 'due process of law' is satisfied. The limitation in the former is 'without due process of law.' In the fourteenth amendment this limitation is accompanied with a prohibition of the denial of the 'equal protection of the laws.' Of course, the latter expression is broader than the former, although it must be conceded that the mere denial of the 'equal protection of the laws' might run into the other limitation.
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Another court held that even if the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is broad enough to guarantee "equal protection of the laws" against Congressional action to the same extent the concerns in terms of the statute's arbitrariness, as opposed to discrimination per se. First, Sutherland suggested that the most constitutionally suspect aspect of the minimum wage law in question was that it placed an arbitrary, unfair burden on a particular class, employers, who should not be expected to bear the costs of supporting employees who lacked the skills to earn a better wage. The Court also suggested that the law contained arbitrary classifications because it purported to provide a minimum living wage for women, yet assigned different wages to women in different occupations, and did not take into account the disparate needs of different women. 
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Harlan then argued that infringement on this liberty cannot be justified by a desire to maintain white supremacy.
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Twelve years later, Harlan authored a similar dissent in Berea College v. Kentucky, 120 arguing that mandatory segregation in private schools violated liberty rights without a valid police power purpose:
The capacity to impart instruction to others is given by the The Court specifically rejected each of Kentucky's asserted police power rationales for upholding the law. First, the Court dismissed the argument that existing "race hostility" was an appropriate rationale for narrowing the scope of citizens' constitutional rights. The Court also rejected the argument that the segregation law came within the police power because it would promote the public peace by preventing race conflict. While the Court acknowledged that this was a desirable goal, it could not be accomplished "by laws or ordinances which deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution."
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The Court added that a segregation law could not be justified as promoting the "maintenance of the purity of the races." 131 The Court noted that the law did not directly prohibit the "amalgamation of the races. Justice Murphy, who dissented, relied explicitly on the Due Process Clause, but only as to the deprivation of procedural due process, not substantive liberty. Id. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Thus, it would be logical to interpret the majority's reference to "civil rights" as the denial of procedural, not substantive rights, and thus an inapt precedent for Bolling's substantive due process holding. In any event, the Japanese plaintiffs were clearly deprived of their liberty in the internment cases. It is therefore not at all clear that any opinion in these cases invoking equal protection principles relied purely on discovering an equal protection component of due process, as opposed to invoking a principle that deprivations of liberty that involve racial classifications will require a stronger police power (or in these cases, national security) justification than would be required to justify a typical deprivation of liberty by the Federal Government.
As for the three opinions cited by Warren for the general proposition that discrimination can be so egregious as to violate due process, a review of the briefs filed in Bolling reveals that, ironically, these three cases were cited by the defendants in Bolling for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment does not contain an Equal Protection Clause. Brief for Respondents, Bolling v. Sharpe, 1952 WL 47280. In fact, these cases were brought to Warren's attention by his clerk, Earl Pollock, who cited them in pointing out to him that Bolling required a separate opinion from the provided by the Due Process Clause overlap with those provided by the Equal Protection Clause, but failed to rely on this rationale. 156 Warren also cited the Japanese internment cases for the proposition that racial classifications must be subjected to heightened scrutiny. 157 However, the point of this citation appears to be that those cases raised the bar for the Federal Government to prove that its violation of Blacks' substantive due process liberty rights was not arbitrary.
Second, the Court could have relied explicitly on the substantive due process jurisprudence of the 1910s and 1920s, adding the right to attend (or send one's child to) a non-segregated public school to the educational liberty rights identified in Meyer, Pierce, and Tokushige.
Instead, Warren ignored all of the relevant substantive due process precedents except for Buchanan v. Warley. As a result, the Bolling opinion seems incoherent, a cross between a halfhearted equal protection opinion and an inscrutable due process opinion.
As we shall in Part III, Warren originally drafted a far more coherent substantive due 
District of Columbia is somewhat different, however. The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia, does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth
Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. Although equal protection has been the basis of most decisions involving racial discrimination, we have previously recognized that discrimination may also constitute a denial of due proces of law.
The "equal protection of the laws" is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process of law," and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process. Once the right to educational liberty was recognized, it was a short leap to Warren's conclusion that just "as a government may not impose arbitrary restrictions on the parent's right to educate his child, the government must not impose arbitrary restraints on access to the education which the government itself provides." 163 And Brown clearly signified that the Court believed that segregation based on notions of white supremacy was an arbitrary restraint on public school education. Note that Warren did not contend that states are obligated to provide public education. Rather, his argument was that once they undertake to do so, they cannot restrict the rights of their citizens to participate in that system except in pursuit of a proper governmental objective. The Court's Lochnerphobia caused another problem. To the extent that Bolling has come to stand for the proposition that the concept of due process contains a guarantee of equal protection of the laws, critics can aptly note that the post-Lochner era precedents Warren relied on were weak at best. However, ample precedent from the Lochner era supported the notion that due process overlaps with equal protection, and some cases and commentators from that era (and also from the Gilded Age) argued that, at least as far as the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause was concerned, due process provided the same equality guarantees as the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
As noted above, an Adkins-style argument in Bolling could satisfy the "originalist" 174 objection that the Fifth Amendment was not intended to protect the rights of African Americans.
An originalist might still object that even if the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause included a notion of equality, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause did not; that opposition to "class legislation" was not part of American constitutional discourse during the 173 See Graglia, supra note 35, at 771. 174 While one originalist methodology would be to argue that the Fifth Amendment was not intended to apply to African Americans, other originalists would note that the Fifth Amendment speaks only of "persons," not "whites." Given that the meaning of the word "person" is not race-exclusive, and given the natural rights background of the Constitution, which provides a rule of construction to interpret ambiguous provisions, these originalists could argue that the Fifth Amendment did indeed include African Americans within its purview, even if the Framers did not intend it to do so. Founding era, and was not written into American constitutional law until the Reconstruction era.
A full examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this Essay, but suffice for now to say that the idea that due process includes a guarantee that all laws be "equal and general" goes back to the founding era and beyond. prevented an individual who wanted her son to attend a particular public school from moving to that district, so the right to pursue an education was not infringed. Moreover, given the advantages of local funding (and thus control) of public schools, local school funding not an arbitrary policy, and a lack of arbitrariness is all that's needed to satisfy a Lochnerian test.
However, Warren's draft Bolling opinion, though Lochnerian in its underlying origins, had declared that the right to pursue an education was a fundamental right. 177 Under modern due process law, a right's status as fundamental means that any infringement of the right is subject to strict scrutiny-the government's actions must not be simply reasonable and non-arbitrary, but also must further compelling interests and be narrowly tailored to serve those interests.
Assuming interdistrict disparities in funding were found to infringe on the right to pursue an education, it would have been difficult to justify these disparities under a compelling interest test.
Even without that assumption, the effect on desegregation lawsuits, in particular, would have been dramatic: plaintiffs would not have had to show that the inequality of resources in black and white schools was traceable to the maintenance of a dual system (discriminatory intent), but rather simply that the inequality infringed on black students' right to pursue their education without compelling justification. lights, the equivalent of taxing Blacks more than whites. The right to be free from discriminatory taxation on an arbitrary basis such as race is certainly within the scope of the classical liberal/libertarian paradigm.
Another surprise is that the proposition that Bolling has come to stand for, that the Fifth Amendment prohibits discrimination by the Federal Government, was not simply "made up" by the Supreme Court, but has a basis in longstanding precedent. The idea that the protection from discrimination provided by the Fifth Amendment is precisely the same as that provided by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, as the Court held subsequent to Bolling, is more of a stretch, but even that view has precedent in cases and commentary from the Gilded Age and the Lochner era.
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Finally, Bolling is an important example of the distorting effect of Lochnerphobia on Supreme Court jurisprudence. As discussed above, Bolling would have been a much stronger opinion had it been willing to explicitly rely on Lochner era precedents such as Meyer and
Tokushige, and to employ a more explicitly Lochnerian view of the Due Process Clause.
Moreover, the Justices' Lochnerphobia eventually led the Court to abandon the liberty-to-pursuean-education basis of Bolling entirely, in favor of an equal protection interpretation of the case. 180 184 Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 185 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the plurality opinion explained that the reason the Court overruled Adkins was because "[i]n the meantime, the Depression had come and, with it, the lesson that seemed unmistakable to most people by 1937, that the interpretation of contractual freedom protected in Adkins rested on fundamentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregulated market to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare." Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-62 (1992) (plurality opinion). Justice Souter later explained that the principle espoused in Lochner-era cases that arbitrary deprivations of liberty violated due process is "unobjectionable," but "while the cases in the Lochner line routinely invoked a correct standard of constitutional arbitrariness review, they harbored the spirit of Dred Scott in their absolutist implementation of the standard they espoused." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 760-61 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
given way to a broader protection of liberty interests against arbitrary governmental interference, and the sharp, post-Lochner era distinction between fundamental liberty rights protected by strict scrutiny and other liberty interests protected only by very limited scrutiny has eroded. 187 In the 2002-03 term, the Court held that both standardless punitive damages awards 188 and restrictions on homosexual sodomy 189 constituted arbitrary violations of rights protected by due process considerations, even though the Court identified no relevant "fundamental rights." The Court instead implicitly concluded that animus toward big business or homosexuals, even if based in deeply-rooted notions of morality, were not valid police power justifications of the defendants' otherwise arbitrary deprivations of the plaintiffs' liberty interests.
In this climate, where Lochnerian substantive due process protection of liberty interests has become relatively routine, though not uncontroversial, 190 perhaps the time has come for courts and commentators to reconsider the Bolling opinion. Bolling was a substantive due process opinion, shorn of precedent and coherent reasoning by a Court afraid of its own Lochnerian shadow. As a result, Bolling receives little support from legal scholars, and has been misintrepreted as a pure equal protection opinion. In fact, with its roots in Buchanan v. Warley and the 1920s educational liberty cases, the liberty right to be free from compelled segregation in education is perhaps better grounded than the liberty right to terminate one's pregnancy, to engage in homosexual sodomy, or to be free from arbitrary punitive damages awards. This will not satisfy critics like Bork who oppose the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence across the board. But for the vast majority of legal scholars who do support the Court's current substantive due process jurisprudence, Bolling should be an easy case to defend.
